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Paradoxical Effects of Testing: Retrieval Enhances Both Accurate Recall
and Suggestibility in Eyewitnesses
Abstract
Although retrieval practice typically enhances memory retention, it can also impair subsequent eyewitness
memory accuracy (Chan, Thomas, & Bulevich, 2009). Specifically, participants who had taken an initial test
about a witnessed event were more likely than nontested participants to recall subsequently encountered
misinformation—an effect we called retrieval-enhanced suggestibility (RES). Here, we sought to test the
generality of RES and to further elucidate its underlying mechanisms. To that end, we tested a dual
mechanism account, which suggests that RES occurs because initial testing (a) enhances learning of the later
misinformation by reducing proactive interference and (b) causes the reactivated memory trace to be more
susceptible to later interference (i.e., a reconsolidation account). Three major findings emerged. First, RES was
found after a 1-week delay, where a robust testing benefit occurred for event details that were not contradicted
by later misinformation. Second, blockage of reconsolidation was unnecessary for RES to occur. Third, initial
testing enhanced learning of the misinformation even when proactive interference played a minimal role.
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Abstract 
Although retrieval practice typically enhances memory retention, it can also impair subsequent 
eyewitness memory accuracy (Chan, Thomas, & Bulevich, 2009).  Specifically, participants who 
had taken an initial test about a witnessed event were more likely to recall subsequently 
encountered misinformation – an effect we called retrieval-enhanced suggestibility (RES).  Here, 
we sought to test the generality of RES and to further elucidate its underlying mechanisms.  To 
that end, we tested a dual mechanism account, which suggests that RES occurs because initial 
testing (1) enhances learning of the later misinformation by reducing proactive interference (PI) 
and (2) initial testing causes the reactivated memory trace to be more susceptible to later 
interference (i.e. a reconsolidation account). Three major findings emerged.  First, RES was 
found after a one-week delay, where a robust testing benefit occurred for event details that were 
not contradicted by later misinformation.  Second, blockage of reconsolidation was unnecessary 
for RES to occur.  Third, initial testing enhanced learning of the misinformation even when PI 
played a minimal role.   
(Abstract word count: 165) 
(Text word count, including References: 4989) 
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Paradoxical Effects of Testing: Retrieval Enhances Both Accurate Recall and Suggestibility 
in Eyewitnesses 
Decades of research have shown that misleading postevent information (or 
misinformation) can distort later eyewitness memory.  Discovery of the misinformation effect is 
largely credited to Loftus and her colleagues (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978), who found that 
subsequent memory for a previously witnessed event can be altered by exposure to intervening 
misleading information.  In a typical misinformation experiment, participants are first presented 
with a witnessed event (e.g., via a video), are then exposed to misinformation about that event 
(e.g., via an audio narrative), and are then questioned about that event with a memory test.  The 
general conclusion is that exposure to misinformation impairs subsequent eyewitness memory 
performance. 
In a separate literature, researchers have rigorously examined the effects of retrieval on 
subsequent memory performance.  The common finding from this literature is that recalling an 
event can enhance subsequent memory for that event – the testing effect.  Cognitive 
psychologists have recently revitalized interest in this phenomenon and many studies have 
confirmed that testing is a powerful memory enhancer (e.g., Chan, McDermott, & Roediger, 
2006; Karpicke & Roediger, 2008).   
Although research on the testing effect and the misinformation effect have been 
conducted on separate fronts, it is not difficult to imagine the practical implications of the testing 
effect for eyewitness memory.  Specifically, if recalling a witnessed event enhances an 
eyewitness’s retention of that witnessed event, would it then reduce the likelihood that the 
eyewitness would fall prey to later misinformation?  Recently, Chan, Thomas, and Bulevich 
(2009) investigated this very question.  Surprisingly, they found that initial testing increased, 
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rather than decreased, participants’ later report of misinformation.  In this paper, we refer to this 
pattern of results as retrieval-enhanced suggestibility (RES).   
The Applied and Theoretical Implications of RES 
 RES has important practical implications.  From a legal perspective, the occurrence of 
RES implies that even psychologists might have underestimated the malleability of eyewitness 
memory.  From an educational perspective, RES represents a case in which testing can harm 
memory performance.  Although research has shown that testing can impair recall of nontested 
information (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994; but see also Chan, 2009; Chan, et al., 2006), the 
RES effect represents a case in which testing can hurt subsequent memory for the tested 
information.  Therefore, investigations of the RES effect may help provide a better 
understanding of when testing will help, and when it will hurt, later memory performance. 
From a theoretical standpoint, investigation of RES may help further the understanding of 
the influence of prior retrieval on subsequent memory.  Chan et al. (2009) proposed that two 
mechanisms are responsible for RES.  The first mechanism produces RES by enhancing learning 
of the misinformation.  Research has shown that taking a memory test on a list of paired 
associates (e.g., A-B) before learning a new list of paired associates (e.g., A-C) augments the 
learning of the latter paired associates (Tulving & Watkins, 1974), relative to a situation in which 
no intervening test occurs between the two learning episodes.  The second mechanism leads to 
RES by reducing the accessibility of the witnessed event information, which occurs because 
testing can increase the detrimental effects of interference on a recently-retrieved memory.  This 
idea is based on the reconsolidation notion in neurobiology (for reviews, see Dudai, 2004; Hardt, 
Einarsson, & Nader, 2010), which states that a memory needs to restabilize after its retrieval, and 
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that the memory becomes particularly susceptible to interference during this reconsolidation 
stage.   
Placing the reconsolidation notion within the context of RES, the presentation of 
misinformation following initial testing might disrupt reconsolidation of the witnessed event 
memories, thus reducing the later recall of these original event details.  In the current paper, we 
do not distinguish between an updating hypothesis (i.e., new learning overwrites the original 
memory) and an inhibition hypothesis (i.e., new learning suppresses retrieval of the original trace 
without overwriting it).  Instead, we focus on the broader conceptualization of reconsolidation; 
that is, a recently-retrieved memory is particularly susceptible to interference.  More generally, 
retrieval may enhance the assimilation of new information with an older memory (e.g., Brown, 
Brown, Mosbacher, & Dryden, 2006; Henkel & Franklin, 1998; Hupbach, Gomez, Hardt, & 
Nadel, 2007; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). 
This dual mechanism account highlights two properties of retrieval.  Firstly, retrieval can 
enhance subsequent learning.  This test-enhanced learning phenomenon is well documented in 
the verbal learning literature and has received renewed attention lately (Karpicke, 2009; Szpunar, 
McDermott, & Roediger, 2008).  Secondly, encountering interference shortly after retrieval can 
impair retention of the retrieved item.  Therefore, from a broader theoretical perspective, the 
RES phenomenon provides an opportunity to further understand these two unique characteristics 
of retrieval. 
A Caveat about the RES Effect 
Although a sizeable RES effect was found in Chan et al.’s experiments (2009), a regular, 
beneficial testing effect was absent for items that were not contradicted by later misinformation 
(i.e., the control items).  For example, after viewing (1) a terrorist use a syringe to knock out a 
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flight attendant and (2) a police officer drive an SUV to work, a participant might hear that a 
terrorist used a chloroform rag to knock out the flight attendant, and that a police officer drove to 
work – with no misinformation being introduced for this latter detail (i.e., this was a control 
item).  Based on the testing effect literature, one would predict that testing should enhance 
retention of at least this latter fact because it was never contradicted by misinformation.  
However, Chan et al. failed to find the typical testing effect for these control items except in a 
modified-modified free recall test (MMFR, Barnes & Underwood, 1959), where participants 
were allowed to report multiple responses for a given query.
1
   
The fact that no significant testing effect was found for the control items in Chan et al. 
(2009) clouds the interpretation of RES and calls its generality into question.  Indeed, the 
original hypothesis – that initial retrieval might inoculate an eyewitness from future 
misinformation – was predicated on the notion that testing can strengthen memory of the original 
event.  If testing does not enhance eyewitness memory, then there is no reason to expect that it 
would reduce the misinformation effect.  It is therefore crucial to investigate whether the RES 
effect will occur when the benefits of initial testing on eyewitness memory is observed.  The 
present study therefore seeks to define the generality of RES by exploiting a characteristic of the 
testing effect – namely, that it increases with delay (Chan, 2010; Wheeler, Ewers, & Buonanno, 
2003).  Therefore, for present purposes, investigating the RES phenomenon under a longer 
retention interval might provide insight into whether RES would occur when a regular testing 
effect is observed for the control questions. 
The Current Experiments 
In Experiments 1 and 2, participants first viewed the witnessed event, completed an 
initial test or a distractor task, listened to the misinformation narrative, and then completed the 
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final test.  In Experiment 1 (E1), the misinformation was presented immediately after the initial 
test, and a 7-day retention interval separated presentation of the misinformation and the final test 
(i.e., immediate misinformation).  In Experiment 2 (E2), a 7-day retention interval separated the 
initial test and presentation of the misinformation (i.e., delayed misinformation, and the 
misinformation was presented immediately before the final test).  Figure 1 displays this schedule 
graphically.  These experiments were designed to address one empirical question and two 
theoretical questions.  The empirical question, as stated earlier, concerns whether the RES effect 
can co-occur with a regular testing effect for the control items.  The theoretical questions concern 
the dual-mechanism hypothesis, which suggests that testing exacerbates the subsequent 
misinformation effect by (1) enhancing learning of the misinformation and (2) by reducing 
accessibility of the witnessed event memories due to reconsolidation blockage.   
A comparison of the results in E1 and E2 may shed light on this account.  Specifically, if 
test-enhanced interference (i.e., the reconsolidation account) is the primary contributor to RES, 
then one should observe this effect in E1 but not E2.  The idea is that a reactivated memory is 
particularly susceptible to interference for only a short period of time, during which the memory 
needs to reconsolidate (Judge & Quartermain, 1982).  In E2, the misinformation was presented 
one week after initial retrieval, which should provide more than enough time for reconsolidation 
to occur (Berman & Dudai, 2001; Przybyslawski, Roullet, & Sara, 1999).  Therefore, based on 
the reconsolidation account, one would expect no RES effect in E2.  
 If RES is based primarily on enhanced learning of the misinformation, then there are two 
predictions.  To make these predictions explicit, one needs to first answer the following question: 
How exactly does testing enhance subsequent learning of the misinformation?  There are two 
possibilities.  First, testing can enhance learning of the misinformation by reducing the influence 
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of proactive interference (PI) on the learning of the postevent narrative (Szpunar, et al., 2008).  
Because the encoding of misinformation is akin to new learning, taking an initial test on the 
witnessed event might strengthen learning of the misinformation, thereby exacerbating the 
misinformation effect on final recall.  Second, taking a test on some details of the witnessed 
event may enhance subsequent learning of these details by drawing attention to them during the 
postevent narrative, which might alter participants’ attentional allocation during new learning 
(for a related discussion, see Nelson, Dunlosky, Graf, & Narens, 1994; Thompson, Wenger, & 
Bartling, 1978).  If test-reduced PI is the primary contributor to RES, then one would predict an 
RES effect in only E1.  Because the effects of PI on new learning diminishes with delay (e.g., 
Underwood & Freund, 1968), its impact on the learning of misinformation should be quite small 
in E2, where the misinformation was presented a full week after the witnessed event.  In contrast, 
if RES occurs because the initial test inadvertently draws attention to the misinformation, then it 
should occur in both E1 and E2.  The logic is that initial testing would draw attention to the 
critical details as long as a testing effect is present (or as long as people still remember the 
questions presented in the initial test).  Note, though, that results from the current experiments 
can rule out the first two hypotheses (i.e., the reconsolidation and the PI hypotheses), but these 
experiments were not designed to provide a critical test of the last hypothesis.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants.  A total of 78 Iowa State University undergraduates participated in 
exchange for course credit.  There were 39 participants in each testing condition. 
Materials and Procedure.  Participants viewed the 43-minute pilot episode of the Fox 
Television program “24” on a computer monitor.  Audio was presented via headphones.  No 
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participants had previously viewed this episode.  Half of the participants then took a 24-question 
(at 25 s each) cued recall test (e.g., Question: What does the terrorist use on the flight attendant?  
Answer [not provided to subjects]: hypodermic syringe) while the remaining participants played 
a videogame (Tetris).  The initial test and the videogame both lasted approximately 12 min.  All 
participants then completed a demographic questionnaire and a synonym/antonym vocabulary 
test for approximately five min.  Next, participants listened to an eight-min audio narrative that 
summarized the video.  The narrative presented (a) eight consistent details (e.g., the terrorist 
knocks a flight attendant unconscious with a hypodermic syringe), (b) eight control details (e.g., 
the terrorist knocks a flight attendant unconscious [with no mention of the critical detail]), and 
(c) eight misleading details (e.g., the terrorist knocks a flight attendant unconscious with a 
chloroform rag).  The status of the critical details was counterbalanced across participants.  A 
week later, participants returned to complete the Operation Span (OSPAN) task and then the 
final cued recall test.  The final test was identical to the initial test taken by participants in the 
testing condition.  Participants were told to answer the questions based on their memory of the 
video.  See the Appendix for the instructions presented in the experiments. 
Results and Discussion 
 A coding system classified the recall data into four categories: Correct, Misinformation, 
Other, or No Answer.  The Correct and Misinformation categories are self-explanatory.  The 
“Other” category refers to responses that match neither the correct answer nor the 
misinformation, whereas the “No Answer” category contains skipped and “I don’t know” 
responses.   
All analyses were conducted with an alpha level of .05.  Partial eta squared (pes) 
indicates effect size for analyses of variance (ANOVA); Cohen’s d indicates effect size for t-
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tests.  Because results from the initial test are not critical for current purposes, they are reported 
in Table 1 only for the sake of completeness.  We concentrate our analyses on the Correct and 
Misinformation data from the final test, and the data from the Other and No Answer categories 
are reported in Table 2.  
 A 2 (testing condition: no-testing, testing) X 3 (item type: consistent, control, misleading) 
ANOVA showed that all main effects and interactions were significant, all Fs > 10.41, pess > 
.22.  Hypothesis-driven comparisons were conducted to better understand the data.  First, was 
there a beneficial testing effect for the items that were not contradicted by later misinformation?  
An examination of Figure 2 reveals that the answer is a definite “Yes.”  Specifically, the control 
items revealed a substantial (22%) testing effect, t(76) = 5.29, d = 1.20, and so did the consistent 
items (15%), t(76) = 3.59, d = .81.  Remarkably, presentation of misinformation eliminated this 
powerful testing advantage, t < 1.  In fact, these items showed an RES effect, such that the tested 
participants were more likely to recall the misinformation (M = .27) than the nontested 
participants (M = .17, see the rightmost pair of bars in Figure 2), t(76) = 2.24, d = .51.  Two 
important conclusions emerged from this finding.  First, the occurrence of RES is not limited to 
situations in which no regular testing effect is found for control items.  Second, the RES effect is 
long-lasting and robust. 
 To further examine the influence of initial testing on eyewitness suggestibility, we 
examined whether participants would fall prey to subsequent misinformation if they were able to 
answer a question correctly during the initial test.  That is, did participants ever switch from a 
correct response to the misinformation from one test to the next?  To our knowledge, this 
question is rarely answered because very few eyewitness memory studies use a test  
misinformation  retest design.  The results indicate that participants changed their correct 
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responses to the misinformation about a quarter of the time (M = .24, SD = .28), which was 
numerically, but not significantly, higher than the probability of misinformation recall for the 
nontested participants (M = .17), t(76) = 1.45, p = .15, d = .32.  These data show that being able 




Participants.  A total of 60 participants (30 in each condition) participated.   
Materials and procedure.  The only difference between E1 and E2 was that the 1-week 
delay preceded presentation of the misinformation in E2 (see Figure 1). 
Results and Discussion 
The main effects for testing condition and item type and their interaction were all 
significant, all Fs > 3.47, pess > .11.  Initial testing dramatically improved accurate recall for the 
consistent (18% better) and control (21% better) items, both ts > 3.70, ds > .95 (see the first and 
third pair of bars in Figure 3).  However, this substantial testing benefit was again diminished for 
the misleading items, such that initial testing no longer significantly enhanced accurate recall for 
these items (see the fifth pair of bars), t < 1.07.  More importantly, these items showed a 
powerful RES effect, such that participants who had taken the initial test reported the 
misinformation much more frequently (M = .55) than their nontested counterparts (M = .42), 
t(58) = 2.32, d = .60 (see the rightmost pair of bars).  This RES effect is problematic for both the 
reconsolidation account and the test-reduced PI account.  We explore the implications of this 
finding in more detail in the General Discussion. 
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 We again examined the likelihood that participants would switch from an originally 
correct response to misinformation.  For E2, this probability was .52 (SD= .35), about doubled 
that from E1.  Again, this probability was numerically, but not significantly, greater than the 
misinformation recall probability of the nontested participants (M = .42), t(58) = 1.29, p = .20, d 
= .35.   To acquire more statistical power, we combined the data from E1 and E2.  This analysis 
revealed that the probability of switching from a correct response to the misinformation (M = 
.38) for the tested participants was higher than the misinformation recall probability of 
participants in the no-testing condition (M = .29), F(1, 134) = 3.79, pes = .03.  This finding 
suggests that the RES effect is not driven only by the event details that participants failed to 
remember in the first place. 
 A comparison of E1 and E2 can also inform whether delaying presentation of the 
misinformation can increase its impact.  Based on the literatures on verbal learning (Crowder, 
1976) and on eyewitness memory (Loftus, et al., 1978; but see also Lindsay, 1990), we expected 
higher levels of misinformation recall in E2 than in E1 – at least in the no-testing condition.  
Indeed, this pattern was observed, such that the nontested participants in E2 were much more 
likely to report misinformation (M = .42) than the nontested participants in E1 (M = .17), t(67) = 
5.93, d = 1.41.  Moreover, participants in the testing condition also demonstrated greatly 
exacerbated misinformation recall in E2 relative to E1, t(67) = 4.94, d = 1.21 (M = .55 and M = 
.27 for E2 and E1, respectively).  Together, these results showed that delaying the presentation of 
misinformation increased its influence on recall, likely because of the recency of the 
misinformation in E2, and this effect occurs regardless of whether an initial memory test was 
administered.   
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General Discussion 
 Three major findings emerged from these experiments.  First, RES is a long-lasting 
phenomenon that can be demonstrated even when control items show a powerful testing benefit.  
Second, the RES effect was not confined to only items that participants were unable to recall 
initially.  Third, blockage of reconsolidation is not necessary for RES to occur and testing can 
enhance new learning even when proactive interference plays a minimal role.  We now discussed 
the implications of these results. 
How robust is the RES effect? 
 A significant RES effect was found in both E1 and E2.  This reveals two important 
properties of RES.  First, the RES effect can be observed regardless of whether a significant 
testing effect is found for the control items.  Second, the RES effect is long-lasting, such that it 
can be elicited a full week after participants were exposed to misinformation (E1) or a week after 
participants witnessed the original event (E2).  Clearly, these results have important applied 
implications – they suggest that eyewitnesses are particularly susceptible to the misinformation 
effect once they have taken an immediate memory test on the witnessed event, regardless of 
when that misinformation is eventually encountered (at least up to a week).   
 Another important finding from the current experiments is that the RES effect does not 
appear to be driven primarily by items that participants could not recall initially.  Two findings 
led us to this conclusion.  First, even if participants could answer a question correctly on the 
initial test, the misinformation recall probability for these items was still greater than that of the 
nontested participants (when we combined the data from Experiments 1 and 2).  Second, there 
was no difference between the rate at which participants switched from a correct (M = .25 in E1 
and M = .52 in E2) and from an incorrect (including responses in the “Other” and “No Answer” 
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categories) response (M = .22 in E1 and M = .59 in E2) to the misinformation in both 
experiments, both ts < 1.  These data are important because they highlight a powerful memory 
enhancing property of testing.  That is, testing does not enhance learning of the misinformation 
for only the items that people fail to encode initially.  Rather, testing can enhance learning of 
new information, regardless of whether that new information conflicts with an existing memory 
trace or whether that new information fills in a gap of the original event memory.  
We elected not to issue a warning in the current experiments because eyewitnesses are 
virtually never warned about the potential misleading nature of postevent information in real-life 
situations (e.g., people can be exposed to misinformation from a variety of trustworthy sources, 
including the news, Lindsay, Allen, Chan, & Dahl, 2004).  As a result, some participants might 
have treated the information presented in the narrative as correct (Belli, 1989).  However, an 
examination of the data from Chan et al. (2009), which used the same experimental protocols, 
indicates that misinformation acceptance cannot account for the finding of RES.  If participants 
mistakenly treat the postevent narrative as a source of accurate information, then they should 
report the misinformation whenever they remember it, even if they also remember a different 
piece of information from the video event.  Therefore, misinformation recall probabilities should 
be similar between a regular cued recall test and an MMFR test.  However, in Chan et al., 
misinformation recall probability was substantially greater in the MMFR test than in the cued 
recall test (an increase of .34 and .35 for the no-testing and the testing condition, respectively), 
suggesting that participants frequently opted to report the video event information over a 
corresponding misinformation, even if they remember both.
2
  Moreover, the parallel increase in 
misinformation recall (from the cued recall test to the MMFR test) for the no-testing and testing 
conditions indicates that even if some level of misinformation acceptance contributes to RES, it 
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does not interact with testing.  In other words, initial testing does not increase misinformation 
acceptance, even if it does increase learning of the misinformation.  It remains possible, though, 
that the RES effect occurs only when participants are not explicitly warned about potential 
inaccuracies in the postevent narrative.  This is an issue that future research will need to address. 
Therefore, like the misinformation effect itself, the RES effect could not be attributed 
solely to strategic processes such as misinformation acceptance or demand characteristics (for a 
review, see Ayers & Reder, 1998).  For current purposes, to the extent that research on the 
misinformation effect is ecologically relevant, what is important is that testing increases the 
misinformation effect.  We now examine the theoretical underpinnings of retrieval-enhanced 
suggestibility.   
The Dual Mechanism Account 
For the dual mechanism account, the current results helped ruled out two potential 
mechanisms – namely, blockage of reconsolidation and test-reduced PI – as the cause of RES.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, both of these explanations predict that no RES should be 
found in Experiment 2, in which a long delay divided the initial test and the misinformation.  
From the perspective of the reconsolidation hypothesis, initial testing should not enhance 
subsequent eyewitness suggestibility if the misinformation was introduced long after the 
reactivated witnessed event memories had been reconsolidated.  Note that although the current 
experiments showed that reconsolidation is not necessary for RES to occur, it remains possible 
that reconsolidation may augment the RES effect under some circumstances (such as those in 
E1).  From the perspective of the test-reduced PI hypothesis, the influence of PI should have long 
dissipated by the time misinformation was presented in E2 (Underwood & Freund, 1968), 
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making it unlikely that taking an initial test provided any “advantage” on the learning of the 
misinformation. 
The RES effect in E2 therefore leaves us with the sole remaining hypothesis.  That is, 
initial testing enhances learning of the misinformation by allowing participants to more 
effectively allocate their attentional resources during the “misinformation learning phase.”  That 
is, asking participants specific questions about the complex witnessed event during the initial 
cued recall test might have inadvertently drawn participants’ attention to these critical, and 
sometimes misleading, details when they listened to the audio narrative (for a related 
phenomenon, see Fazio & Marsh, 2008).  Because the current experiments were not designed to 
critically evaluate this attentional allocation hypothesis, more research needs to be conducted to 
further examine its contribution to RES.   
From an educational perspective, however, the current finding highlights the fact that 
prior testing can potentiate new learning (Izawa, 1970).  Although previous studies have 
established the beneficial effects of testing on subsequent learning (e.g., Karpicke, 2009; 
Szpunar, et al., 2008), to our knowledge, all of them presented the new learning phase 
immediately or soon after initial testing.
3
  Therefore, it has been unclear whether testing can 
potentiate subsequent learning if the two learning episodes are separated by a long retention 
interval – our results show that it can.   
Concluding Remarks 
In the current experiments, we demonstrated that initial testing can dramatically improve 
the long-term retention of a witnessed event.  However, our data also showed that, despite a 
powerful, beneficial testing effect on subsequent eyewitness memory for control information, 
later presentation of misleading suggestions can eliminate and even reverse any such benefit.  
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These results are beginning to elucidate the mechanisms underlying the RES phenomenon.  More 
generally speaking, achieving a more thorough understanding of the effects of retrieval on 
eyewitness memory is instrumental to helping researchers and policy makers devise methods to 
improve the probative value of eyewitness reports. 
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  The MMFR procedure departs substantially from the accuracy-driven criteria that characterize 
most eyewitness memory reports.  Consequently, these results cannot be taken as evidence that 
initial testing can enhance later retention of eyewitness materials under normal RES conditions.   
2
  No such increase was found for any other response types.  Therefore, the higher rate in 
misinformation recall in the MMFR test relative to the cued recall test cannot be attributed to a 
shift in response criterion. 
3
  The delayed feedback effect has been investigated extensively (e.g., Butler, Karpicke, & 
Roediger, 2007), but the current issue is whether testing can enhance new learning after a delay.  
The typical studies on feedback do not include a testing vs. no-testing manipulation because 
feedback, by definition, is given only after a test. 
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Table 1 
Probability of Response (Correct, Other, No Answer, or Spontaneous Recall of Misinformation) 
















        
        
Correct .58 (.11)  .53 (.10) 
      
Other .31 (.12)  .30 (.13) 
      
No Answer .06 (.07)  .12 (.11) 
      
Misinformation 
 
.05 (.04)  .05 (.04) 
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Table 2 
Probability of response (“Other” or “No Answer”) as a function of testing condition and 
question type.  Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 




    









        
  Testing  No-Testing  Testing  No-Testing 
        
        
        
        
Consistent Questions        
        
Other .24 (.14)  .32 (.16)  .12 (.12)  .21 (.17) 
        
No Answer .04 (.08)  .10 (.14)  .06 (.11)  .13 (.16) 
        
Control Questions        
        
Other .32 (.16)  .50 (.21)  .29 (.19)  .44 (.18) 
        
No Answer .06 (.13)  .13 (.17)  .15 (.14)  .22 (.17) 
        
Misleading Questions        
        
Other .27 (.16)  .34 (.22)  .19 (.12)  .33 (.17) 
        
No Answer .05 (.12)  .13 (.14)  .06 (.10)  .11 (.14) 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1.  A graphical depiction of the delay schedules used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Figure 2.  Results from the final test in Experiment 1: Probability of correct and misinformation 
recall as a function of item type (consistent vs. control vs. misleading) and initial testing 
condition (testing vs. no-testing).   
Figure 3.  Results from the final test in Experiment 2: Probability of correct and misinformation 
recall as a function of item type (consistent vs. control vs. misleading) and initial testing 
condition (testing vs. no-testing).   
Running head: TESTING AND DELAY ON EYEWITNESS MEMORY           26 
 











































































Experiment 1 - Immediate Misinformation






























Experiment 2 - Delayed Misinformation
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Appendix 
Instructions for the witnessed/video event 
You will now watch an episode of the television show “24”.  The video is about 40 minutes long.  
Unlike watching a TV show at home, I'd like you to watch this video with a critical eye.  Try to 
pay as much attention to the details as possible and try your best to remember what's going on in 
the video.  Your memory for the video will be tested later. 
Instructions for the initial test 
Please answer the following questions to your best ability.  Every question will ask you for some 
detail that occurred in the video you just saw.  Be as accurate as possible and answer as many 
questions as you can.  You will have 25 seconds to answer each question.  There is no need to 
press "ENTER".  The next question will show up automatically.  Simply type your answer into 
the computer.  If you have any questions, please ask your experimenter now.  Otherwise, please 
let the experimenter know that you are ready to start.    
Instructions for the audio narrative 
You will now listen to an audio narrative of a recap of the episode you saw earlier.  The narrative 
is about eight minutes long.  Listen to this narrative closely.  Afterwards, I'll give you a final test. 
Instructions for the final test 
Earlier in this experiment you watched a video.  Now you will answer some questions about the 
video.  Please answer the following questions to your best ability.  Every question will ask you 
for some detail that occurred in the video you saw earlier.  Be as accurate as possible and answer 
as many questions as you can.  But do not guess if you have no idea what the answer is. 
